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individual in heterodox 
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1 Introduction 
Two rnain differences disHnguish mainstrcarn and heterodox economics' 
ways of understanding the individual. First~ whcreas mainstrearn 
economics treats individuals as atomistic beings, heterodox economics 
generally characterizes individuals as being embeddcd in networks of 
social and economic relationships. Second, whereas there is a fair amount 
of agreement across mainstream economists over what the atornistic 
conception of the individual generally involves, different schools of 
heterodox economists tcnd to disagree over how to understand the nature 
of the individual and individual embeddedncss. Indced, heterodox 
economists within diffcrcnt schools also often disagree over how 
individual embeddedness is to be understood. This suggests thc need for 
developing a concrete strategy for investigating the tapie of the 
ernbedded individual in heterodox economics. My strategy in this chapter 
is first to distinguish two broad approaches within hetcrodox economics 
to understanding the individual as a socially and economically embedded 
being, and then to attempt to show how a critical realist understanding of 
individual and society helps us understand these two approaches. 
Preliminary to doing this/ however/ 1 set out a general understa.nding of 
vvhat it means to talk about individual embeddedness, vvithin which these 
two broad approaches can be distinguished and explaincd. This thrcc-
part discussion - general understanding, two broad approaches, and 
particular heterodox schools- describes the overall arder and structure of 
the chapter. 
The next two sections of the chapter set forth a general understanding 
of vvhat it means to talk about individuals as bcing cmbcdded in networks 
of sociül nnd cconomic rclationships. Section II begins by surveying a 
collection of concepts used in describing embeddcd individuals that havc 
been developed in the social psychology literature on the subject of the 
individual's 'self-concept.' Section Ill then advunces a general conception 
of the ernbedded individual based on a critica! realist understanding of 
the relationship between individual and society. Here 1 draw on Lawson's 
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Economics and Reality Part III agency-structure analysis to describe a 
complex dynamic betvvecn individuals and social-economic structures 
which transforms each as well as the relationship between them over 
time. Lawson's analysis is general in that the form or character of the 
means by which individuals and structurcs cach opera te u pon onc another 
is left intentionally uninterprctcd in thc intcrcst of charactcrizing thc 
relationship between them in the broadest possible terms. ~structures' for 
Lawson include not just more highly institutionalized social 
arrangernents and social positions, but also uncodified, more informal 
social norms/ routines, and conventions. Indeed, it is differences over the 
relative importance of these respective types of means by which 
individuals and structures influence one another - and therefore 
differences over interpretation of the concept of 1Social structure' - that 
provide us \vith a basic distinction between the two broad heterodox 
approaches to understanding individual embeddedness. 
Section IV distinguishes two broadly different approaches to 
understanding the embeddedncss of individuals in nctworks of social 
and economic relations in terms of two different types of means by \vhich 
individuals and society influence one another: institutions and social 
values. The institutions approach works by examining ho\v institutions 
structure interactions between individuals, and hnw individuals in turn 
influence the structure of society by creating and transforming 
institutions. The social values approaclz works by examining how social 
values structure interactions between individuals, and ho\v indíviduals in 
tum influence social values. Though I dichotornize two approaches to 
understanding the agency-structure relationship, there are clearly 
important similarities between the two approaches. This reflects the fact 
that they both draw on a single understanding of índividuals as socially 
and economically embedded rather than atomistic. 
Section V then briefly summarizes thinking about agency and structure 
in reference to six heterodox economic schools - institutionalist 
economics, social economics, radical/Marxist economics, Post Keynesian 
economics, feminist economics, and ecological economics - according to 
their respective reliance upon one or both of the two approaches set out 
hére. The section concludes with summary remarks regarding \Vhat 
critica! realism offers to the overall framework. 
11 Social psychology's concept of the individual: 
the ¿self-conccpt' 
The concept of the individual, or more specifically the "self-concept' as it 
is generally termed in the social psychology literature (Rosenberg 1979; 
Gecas 1982; Demo 1992), dates from the late 1960s, and reflects the nature 
of social psychology as an intcrstitial social scicncc sharcd by sociologists 
and psychologists. The concept has been said to be 'rapidly becoming the 
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134 ]oJm B. Davis 
dominant concern '\-Vithin social psychology . . . as part of the general 
intellectual shift from behavioral to cognitivc and phenomenological 
orientations' in both sociology and psychology (Gecas 1996). Those with 
a more sociological orientation within social psychology usually examine 
the social antecedents of individual behavior, whereas those with a more 
psychological oríentation within social psychology rather tend to 
investigate the social consequences of individual motivation and 
behavior. Social psychological research on the concept of the self as a 
wholc combines these two orientations by investigating how individual 
identity is reflexively constituted and reconstituted out of a socíally influenced 
process of self-evaluation, self-imagirzing, and seif-awareness engaged in by tite 
individual. The self-concept is thus a concept of individual identity 
understood as 'situationally variable,' yet a.lso relatively stable, as 
suggested by the idea of a 'moving baseline' subject to .fluctuation and 
change (Demo 1985). The concept reflects social psychology's 
comparativcly more dialectical mode of investigation in comparison with 
the more uni-directionally oriented dynamics of sociology and 
psychology, which examine either the impact of social structurc on the 
individual or the irnpact of the individual on social structurc. 1-Iere 1 
provide only a very brief review of a number of thernes in the social 
psychology litcrature that bear on the individual self-concept. In m y view, 
thc social psychology litcraturc on the self-concept is valuable for 
thinking about individuals as socially and economically cmbedded, 
because of its emphasis on the individual as a bcing continually 
constituted and reconstituted in a socially in.fluenced process of self-
evaluation . 
The seif-concept itself in the most general sense, then, is that 
understanding which individuals acquire of themselves as a result of the 
influence of social structures upon their processes of self-appraisal 
(Rosenberg 1979). Within this general understanding, the self-concept is 
conccivcd both (i) in terms of self-appraisal processes in ·which the 
individual thínks of herself as a subject, an '1,' and a knowcr, and (ii) in 
terms of self-appraisal processes in which the individual sccs herself asan 
object for others, a 'me,' and a self known by others. Social psychologists 
with the former, more psychological oricntation cxplain the self-concept 
in terms of in di vid u al desire to establish a scnsc of self, using the term 
'self-esteem' to emphasize 'the evaluative and emotional dimensions of 
the self-concept.' Social psychologists with the la tter, more sociological 
orientation use the concept of individual identity to 'focus on the 
meanings comprising the self as an object' withln a social context (cf. 
Cecas 1982: 4). The former emphasis on sclf-cstccm makcs the individual 
activity or agency that produces a self-concept central, whereas the latter 
emphasis on identity gives greater wcight to society' s influence on 
in di vi dual self-eval ua tion. 
------------- -------·--··-- -···---· 
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. ~o~h ori~ntations, howevcr, assume that how others judge an 
Individua~ 1nfluences the formation of the individual's self-concept 
(whether In the self-esteem sense or in the idcntíty sense), and use this to 
argue that the self-concept involves a sort of 'rcflected' self-uppraisal. At 
the same time, it is also recognized that the self-concept as a kind of 
reflected self-appraisal stilllacks good empirical foundations, since while 
it is plausible to say that people's self-concepts reflect the way they believe 
others see them, there nonetheless seems to be little evidence supporting 
close correspondence between people's self-concepts and the way people 
are actually seen by others. The problem is that it is not obvious just how 
peoplc's 'sclf-cvaluations are ínfluenced by the feedback received by 
others' (Shrauger and Schoeneman 1979). Possible reasons for this have 
been suggested for both the self-esteem and identity understandings of 
the c~ncep~. The way in which individuals establish self-esteem may be 
selectlve w1th respect to good and bad opinions of others as well as with 
respect to whose opinions are observed. Alternatively, the way in which 
individuals establish an identity concept may reflect norms of social 
interaction in a culture, whereby customary practices conditíon the form 
of appraísal from others, and create differences between how others 
perceive an individual and express thcir views of that individual 
(Goffman 1959). Thus in addition to the basic psychological and 
sociological types of approaches to the self-concept itself, there a re also 
distinct psychology-based and sociology-based strategies for explaining 
the ways in which others' opinions fecd back upon and affect indíviduals' 
sclf-appra isal.1 
But for our purposes, the most important aspect of the social 
psychology literature on the self-concept is its shift toward greatcr 
emphasis on the dynamic effects of interaction between the individual 
and society. Thus while the earlier social psychologicalliterature on the 
se1f-concept tended to cmphasize constancy and stability in individuals' 
self-concepts, in order to develop a cohercnt conception of u 'maintained' 
self, there now appears to be incrcasing agreement that emphasis should 
also be placed upon a 'plasticity of characteristics previously assumcd to 
be stable throughout the life course', implying a more "'open" or 
"unfinished" character of the human organism in relation to its 
environment' (Dannefcr 1984: 107; cf. Demos 1992). One such vicw, 
widely influential in the social scienccs and health fields, is of the self-
concept as an organized succession of different types of ages, for example 
developn1.ental age as a set of n1canings associated with personal passage 
from youth through old age, social age as the social rneanings of age at 
various transitions and turning points in social life, and historical age as 
rneanings associated with the experiencc of different cohorts a~d 
generations in history (Eldcr 1991). But there are many other ·ways. tn 
which thc plasticity of the individual could be understood when taktng 
the idea of the individual as a sort of 'moving baseline.' Thus in principie 
' 
. ' 
~· 
. ' 
, , , . 
! 
,. 
' 
i 
' .~ 
1
1 ¡ ¡ . 
i :: 
1 : 
, L, . . 
• 1 ,, j ; . 
. 1 ~ 
i ¡.:,;,., 
1 ¡ ' , i j. 
i : ¡ 
·, 
i 
. ! 
: , 1 
¡ ¡ 
! ¡ 
: . ' 
1 1 
:! 
136 folm B. Dnvis 
the social psychological self-concept should be amenable to e1nployment 
in economics frameworks that emphasize dynantic, mutually constituting 
relationships between individual and society. 
What, then, does the social psychology thinking on the self-concept 
have to offer heterodox economics on thc subjcct of thc rclationship 
between individual and society? In the first place, it offcrs ncw rcsourccs 
in the idea of the individual as specifically a reflexive being, or as a being 
that forms a self-concept in a social context. Heterodox economists 
generally stress the influence of society on the individual per se, but less 
often investiga te how this influence produces changes in individuals' self-
concepts. Indeed the issue of individual or agent identity itself 
infrequently aríses in heterodox economics. Second, the social psychology 
of the individual is valuable in that it emphasizcs thc idea of the 
individual as an active being. Individua]s are activcly engagcd in 
reconstituting their self-concepts in light of social influences upon thcm. 
Generally rnethodologically holist, heterodox economics emphasizes the 
active influence of society on individuals, but less often explains how 
individuals in turn actively influence social structures. Third, social 
psychology's self-concept offers opportunities to heterodox economics in 
that its combination of the different causal strategies of sociology and 
psychology makes reciproca! cause and effect relationships central to 
cxplaining both individual and society as both cause and consequence of 
one anothcr. Heterodox economics, by understanding individuals as 
socially and cconomically embedded, already employs these themes, but 
would be better able to develop then'l were it to incorporate a more 
developed concept of the agent as an active being.2 
In this latter regard, the agency-structure modcl of individual and 
society, as dcvcloped in Lawson's Econonzics and Reality, provides a way of 
incorporating the kcy ideas involvcd in social psychology's sclf-concept 
in heterodox economics' general understanding of individuals as socially 
and economically embedded, since Lawson's analysis of the 
agency-structure model is both rooted in a heterodox economics vision, 
and employs a thinking about individuals and agency quite close to social 
psychology's self-concept. I thus now turn to Lawson's analysis to further 
develop a heterodox account of the relationship between individual and 
society that expla.ins human agency as reflexive and active and the 
relationship between individual and society as one of reciproca! cause 
and effect. 
III The agency-structure model of individual and society 
The inspiration behind the agency-structure model lies in the idea 
that the opposition betwcen mcthodological individualisrn and 
mcthodological collectivism can be overcomc by rcgarding agency and 
structure as dynamically interactivc. An early formulation is Giddcns' 
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influential istructuration theory,' which trcats individuals and social 
stntctures as interdependent, oras a duality~ such that each may be said 
to help constitute the othcr~ cspecialJy through recurrent social practices 
(1976, 1984). Bhaskar (1979 [1989]) and Archer (1995) revised and 
extended Giddens' thinking, príncipally by seeing reality as stratificd and 
Inulti-layered "\Vith emergent properties differentiating one layer or levcl 
from another (cf. Hodgson 2000: 5-13; also Collier 1994). Lawson 
developed this Jatter, critical realíst conception of the agcncy-structure 
relationship specifically for economics in Part III of his Economics atzd 
Reality (1997), and used it primarily to critique the m.ethodological 
posture of mainstream economics. 1 use it instead to understand the 
embedded individual in heterodox econornics~ and carry out an 
ontological analysis of agents in economic life. Central to this latter project 
is how the model accounts for the reciproca! effects of human agcncy and 
social structure upon one another, and how the rnodel treats human 
agency as intcntional activity. 1 argue that this framework is in need of a 
fuller undcrstnnding of the individual, and attempt to provide one along 
the lines developed in social psychology. In my view, then, an 
agency-structure rnodel expandcd to include an accormt of individuals 
can account for processes of social reproduction and transforrnation that 
both bear upon and help us rmderstand the identity of individual 
econor~:üc agents. This fullcr account with its altemative conception of the 
individual economic agcnt ns socially and economically ernbedded is 
what 1 believe is rnost needed for heterodox economics to distinguish 
itself from orthodox economics. 
Thc basic idea of the agency-structure model, then, is that social 
structure depends on human agency, and human agency depends on 
social structure. First, consider how social structurc depends u pon human 
agency. The agency-structure model of individual and society is 
specifically a critica! realist analysis in that, as a realist rnodel for a social 
science, the model makes 'social structure dependent upon human 
agency . . . open to transformation through changing human practiccs 
which in turn can be affected by criticísing the conception.<; and 
undcrstandings on which people act' (Lawson 1997: 158, original 
cmphnsis). That is, social structure changes, because human practices 
change, because people critically evalunte the ideas which those practices 
reflect. This does not imply, of course, that human agcncy is an 
un1nediated force acting on social structure free of all social influence. The 
process of replacing one sct of 'conceptions and understandings' with 
another clearly involves the idea that individuals operate upon an 
inherited sct of materinls. So indirectly social structure still plays a role in 
criticism. But this raises a long-debated question. Might this not imply 
that human agency is ultimately only a product of social structure, and 
thnt it is a mistake to say that social structure depends on agency? 
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138 Jolm B. Davis 
Onc way to resist this conclusion is to say that when vve take 
indíviduals as agents of change, thcir seif-conceptions and self-
understandings, which individuals continually organize and reorganize 
to create their self-concepts, play a central role in organizing the great 
mass of 'conceptions and undcrstandings' individuals regularly have 
about the world. The process of forming a self-concept, involving the 
replacement and abandonment of one set of self-conceptions with 
another, is understood in social psychology as a rcflexive and active 
process in which individuals absorba range of conceptual materials from 
society (say, a grasp of customs, understandings of markets, knowledge of 
legal principies, etc.), and then actively integrate these materials in terms 
of their self-conceptions (say, that 1 ought to behave in sorne way or 
another, that I can participate in such-and-such a market in sorne fashion, 
that the law applies tome in a particular manner). That they may be said 
todo this implies that they are able to distinguish themselves as selves (as 
I's or rne's) about which they organize these materials. As a property of 
individuals as agents, that is, reflexivity implies that individuals possess 
a measure of detachment or relative autonomy from the social influences 
operating upon them though they draw upon them. The critica} realist 
understanding of the agency-structure relationshíp implicitly invests 
individuals "\\'ith this active capacity when it describes them as regularly 
engaged in 'critícisin.g the conccptions and understanding on which 
people act.' What social psychology adds to this is the idea that this 
criticism also cxtends to self-conceptions and self-understandings, and the 
capacity to engage in this further criticism enables us to see individuals as 
relatively autonomous agents. Frorn this perspective, it is fair to say that 
in the agency-structure model, social structure influences indíviduals, yet 
is also itself dependent u pon human agency. 
Now consider the other side of the agency-structure modcl, or the 
reciproca! dependcncc of human agency on social structure. Given what 
has been said above, how exactly are we to understand this dependence 
and the way that society influences individual agency? Lawson makcs 
two points in this regard . First, in rejecting the reductionist project of 
methodological individualism, he argues that 'social structures (rules, 
relations, positions)' are real in the sense of beíng irreducible to the 
actions of individuals (1997: 161). Second, social structure is said to be a 
prccondition for individual action in that, as said above, individuals draw 
upon it whcn acting. More specifically, in rejecting the orthodox 
understanding of rationality, Lawson substitutes a thcory of sítuated 
ratíonality whereby: 'At any given point in time any individual is situated 
in a rangc of positions' associated with which are 'rules to dra\v upon, 
obligations to fulfill, structures of powcr to utilise and be influenced by' 
(1997; 187). These positions, and the rules, obligations, and structures of 
power upon which they depend, constitute the social preconditions for 
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individual action which help explain how human agency depcnds upon 
social structure. 
What we may add to this in drawing on social psychology's self-
concept is further understanding of just how these social preconditions 
impose their influencc on individuals. When we add a self-concept to our 
understanding of individuals, wc say that society's rules, obligations, and 
structures of power help determine thc form and shape of individuals' 
self-conceptions. For examplc, a particular social obligation, such as that 
an individual return a favor, involvcs a set of expectations of that 
individual which crcatc a set of self-understandings for that individual. 
Society's rules, obligations, and structures of power, that is, really only 
become preconditions for individual action when they are translated into 
conceptions that apply specifically to particular individuals in terms of 
the self-conceptions thcy gcncrate. The theory of embedded rationality 
broadly emphasizes the relationship between social structure and 
individual positions within a social structure. The social psychology self-
concept specifically links social structure and positions through the 
particular individual's apprchension of this relationship, as formulated in 
terms of that individual's self-conceptions and ultimately self-concept. 
Social structurc, thcn, is a precondition for human agency in the sense of 
situating rationality in social positions, but, because individuals engaged 
in forming self-conccpts actively grasp their social positions in applying 
rules, obligations, and expectations to thernselves, human agency is 
dependent upon but not determined by social structure. 
Thus human agency depcnds upon social structure, just as social 
structure depends upon agency. The agency-structure model of 
individual and society consequently aims to explain the reproduction and 
transformation of both human agency and social structures. A 
consequence of this is that it may be said to avoid the (twin but opposite) 
errors of voluntarism and reification/ determinism, where voluntarism 
explains social structures as essentially the creation of individuals (as in 
sorne methodological indivídualist accounts), and reification/ 
determinism sees individuals as essentially the product of social 
structures (as in sorne methodological collectivist accounts). The way in 
which the model achieves this is by emphasizing that human agency is 
intentional activity. From this two things follow. First, 'most structural 
reproduction and/or transformation arises as the unintended product [of 
human intentional activity], whether or not desired or even recognised' 
(Lawson 1997: 169). Though human agency creates social structures, 
intentional activity cannot fully explain the evolution of social structures 
(the error of voltmtarism), because its results are in significant degree 
unintended. We might add to this that if indivíduals operate in sorne 
fundamental sense in terms of their self-concepts, then the scope of their 
activities is necessarily restricted, and the consequences of their actions 
are likely often unintended. Second, 'If the reproduction/transformation 
l, . 
i 
' ¡ ' 
; ' 
' ' 
' . 
. . ' 
'. 
!- . 
., 
i. 
i 
r :¡ , 
., ' 
i 1 
; !...:...... 
. ¡ : 
1 
1 ; .¡ 
' 
~ . i 
: 1 
. 1 
·l 
1 
1 
i 
1 
· i 
i 
140 John B. Davis 
of social structure is rarely an intended project, it is equally the case that 
the individual agents are not always aware, certainly not discursively or 
self-consciously so, of the structures (such as language rules) upon which 
they are drawing' (1997: 169). We may add here that if individuals' self-
concepts are by nature always open and unfinished, they cannot be 
expected to smoothly accommodate all social influences and feedback 
from others, so that the individual's awareness of the import of social 
structures is always incompletc. This rcinforccs thc idea that though 
social structurcs influencc human agency, they do not determine 
intentional human activity (the error of reification/ deterrninism). 
Yet if this account depends upon treating human agency as intentional 
activity, what are we to say about the pervasiveness of highly routinized 
forros of activity in human society? Lawson allows that much of human 
behavior does not take on the aspect of being intentional. If we 
distinguish between discursive and tacit consciousness, where the former 
involves conscious reflection on a particular subject, and the latter 
involves individuals monitoring their conduct at a subconscious level, 
then it seerns obvious that individuals often rely upon a body of tacit 
knowledge and skills in order todo such things as follow rules, observe 
norms, and act in accordance with conventions without reflecting directly 
upon doing so. But such activity is still purposcful, and thus also fairly 
trcated as a form of intcntional activity. Wcrc thc individual íntcrrupted 
in the performance of an episode of rule-following, typically a reason for 
following the rule could be given. This verdict is important not just 
beca use routine is such an important part of hun1an behavior, but because 
understanding routinized behavior as a forrn of intentional activity is 
important for developing a more complete understanding of the 
individual and human subjectivity in the agency-structure model. 
Generally, Lawson's discussion of the processes of reproduction and 
transformation in the agency-structure model tends to associate these 
processcs 'vith the cvolution of social structurcs. But to be complete, the 
processcs of rcproduction and transformation of agency and social 
structure should also be associated with the evolution of human 
subjectivity, the agency side of the rnodel. Here his discussion of routines 
as a form of intentional activity opens the door to one way to go about 
this. Lawson asks why so rnuch human activity is routinized. Part of the 
answer lies in the simple fact that \Ve seem unable to apply discursive 
decision-making to all occasions jn Hfe where it rnight be possible to do 
so. But if this is necessary to explaining routines, it is not sufficient, since 
other responses to this inability, such as inactivity, are also available. A 
sufficient explanation that Lawson contemplates is that this human 
inability causes individuals anxiety and stress, and that individuals 
accordingly rcly on routinzcd bchavior to reduce tbis anxiety and stress. 
Thcn thc fullcr account of thc agcncy-structurc modcl that includes un 
cxplanation of the cvolution of human subjcctivíty would involve 
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describing ho\.v routines cvolve togcther \'\dth individuals' cvolving 
strategíes for combating anxiety and stress. 
Yet it is not far from saying this to the social psychology idea of the 
individual self-concept. lndeed Lawson adds that individuals n1.ay be 
thought to have a need for 'inner security' 'vhich in turn may reflect a 
need for 'a significant degree of continuity, stability and sameness in daily 
affairs' (1997: 180). A 'va y of understanding continuity and stability in life 
is in terms of how they prornote continuity and stability in an individual's 
self-concept. Recalling the ~moving baseline' expression, individuals 
might be said to rely on routinized activity, because doing so promotes 
continuity and stability in their self-concepts. Lawson in fact suggests just 
such an argument when (following R.D. Laing and Giddens) he treats a 
need for inner security as a need for an 'ontological security; where the 
'psychological origins of ontological security are to be found in basic 
anxiety-controlling rnechanisms ... hierarchically ordered as components 
of personality' (Giddens 1984: 50; quoted in Lawson 1997: 183). 
Ontological security, that is, applies to a subject, or the individual. Thus, 
the processes of rcproduction and transformation that are explicitly 
associatcd with the evolution of social structures in Lawson's 
agency-structure rnodel seem equally applicable to the evolution of 
human subjectivity. Here I don't recommend this or any other particular 
account of how to go about understanding the evolution of human 
subjectivity. It is enough for the purposes of this chapter to emphasize that 
a general agency-structure model is a model of interactive processes of 
reproduction and transformation affecting both social structurcs and 
human subjectivity. 
There is one rninor point about Lawson's discussion to be rnade before 
passing on to the two rnain approaches or "\vays of understanding 
individual embeddedness in heterodox economics. The agency-structure 
model, by using the term 'structure', seerns to favor one of the two general 
approaches identified at the beginning of this chapter regarding the 
means by which individuals and socicty influence one nnother, namely, 
that approach which cmphasizes the role of socio-econornic institutions 
rather than that which emphasizes social values. However, it is clearly not 
Lawson's intent to favor one of the two general approaches, since his 
discussions of ¿structure' include a variety of social apparatuses which are 
better represented in terms of social values, or perhaps value structures, 
than in terrns of institutionalized social arrangements. More careful 
discussion of this distinctíon must be postponed to the next section. But it 
scems fair to say at this point that Lawson's discussions of rules and 
conventions allow a role for social values, and need not only be 
understood in terrns of more institutionalized social arrangements. 
¿Structure' of course also refers to institutionalized social arrangements. 
The agency~structure model, then, is general in that it allows a role for 
:l. 
i 
1 
l 
! 
1 
l 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
~ : 
t : 
l . ' . 
¡:_....... 
' i 
. ! 
• 1 
. ~ 
; 
. . ¡ ; 1 
! . 
· : ¡ 
142 John B. Davis 
both types of mechanisrns of influence upon individuals, while 'structure~ 
is to be understood both in tcrms of institutions and in terms of values. 
IV Heterodox economics' two approaches to the 
agency-structure relation 
In this section I contrast two broadly diffcrent types of ways of 
understanding the reproduction and transformation of both social 
structures and human subjectivity according to hvo different kinds of 
means by which individuals and society each influence one another. At 
the beginning of this chapter, I characterized the difference between thcse 
two approaches as a difference between how more highly 
institutionalized social arrangements and social positions influence and 
are influenced by individuals, and how less formal social norms, routines~ 
and conventions influcnce and are influenced by individuals. I thus begin 
here by explaining (í) how individuals influence the transformation and 
evolution of ínstitutions and social values (Lawson's topic of how social 
structure depends upon agency). Then I turn to thc reciproca! matter of 
(ii) how social-economic institutions and social valucs differ in the ways 
in which they operatc upon individuals (Lawson's topic of how agency 
depends upon social structure). Finally, I outline (iii) the overall 
agency-structure cause-and-effect system, in arder to provide an account 
of its dynanúcs in terms of tensions between both kínds of factors 
operating on both individuals and social-economic structure in the form 
of institutions and social values . 
(i) Individuals' tlifferent kinds of influence 011 iustitutions 
and social values respectively (social structure's dependence 
on ageucy) 
Individuals may be said to influence institutions when they engage in 
interaction which departs from what institutions permít or requirc, and 
which subsequently brings about changes in existing institutions or leads 
to new ones. lt seems fair to say that much individual action and 
interaction behveen individuals is not structurcd by institutions. Take, for 
example, antitrust laws as social-econornic institutions determining the 
scope of individual action for individual business firms. In the past such 
laws have generally been natíonal in scope, leaving the efforts on the part 
of firms to restrict competition among themselves across national 
boundaries largely unregulated. In response, in many countries existing 
antitrust laws have been reínterpreted to accommodate extra-territorial 
economic behavior, while new supranational antitrust agreements 
bctwccn countrics have also begun to emerge. Thus institutions havc 
been influenced by interaction between individuals (or firms takcn as 
individuals) occurring outside of thc framcwork of existi.ng institutions. 
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Understanding these firms in self~concept terrns, we might say that this 
overall developrnent begins when firms determine hovv exceptions in 
existing laws apply to themselves. That is, they entertain new self-
conceptions by, in Lawson's language, 'criticizing' the practices and 
institutions under which they operate. This then creates the opportunity 
for their interaction with one another in restraint of competition, which in 
turn may lead to change in institutions. Thus individual action and 
interaction outside of institutional fran1eworks tend to lead to change in 
thosc framcworks. 
Alternatively, individuals may be said to influence social values whcn 
they share personal values different from widely held social values, and 
their doing so subsequently brings about a change in social values. 
Personal values may both coincide wíth and also differ frorn widcly hcld 
socia] values. Whcn thcy differ, the 'personal' character of an individual's 
valucs is reinforced by their apparent lack of \'videspread acceptance. But 
appearances may be deceiving, and it is possible that so-called 'personal' 
values are shared by many individuals, unbeknownst to them. Should 
individuals, then, discover that they in fact share "\Vhat they believed was 
largely personal, their personal values rnay begin to acquirc a social 
character as wcll. For cxatnple, consider an electoral proccss. Prospective 
voters may share vicws about candidates and outcomes befare public 
discussion and debate define electoral issues. As the la tter proceed, 
however, individuals may discover they share others' opinions and 
values. In self-concept terms, individuals find that their 'personal' values 
are shared when they formula te new se lf-conceptions regarding how their 
'personal' values con1pare with those of others. Social values may thus 
emerge from this rccognition of shared personal values, and consequently 
social values are influenced by personal values. 
Note that both of these two mcans by "\Vhich individual action and 
decision influence social structure - interactions between individuals 
affecting institutions and sharing personal values affecting social values-
are supra-individual in character in that they explain action and dccision 
in terms of relationships between individuals. This implies that in a 
complete agency-structure model we ought to be able to explain the 
human subjectivity side of the model not just in terms of the behavior of 
collections of relatively independent individuals but in a stronger sense of 
individuals sornehow acting together. That is, we nced sorne coherent 
means of discussing how individuals use the language of 'wc' as vvell as 
the languagc of '1' and 'me' if we are to fully explain human subjectivity 
and individuality. This discussion gocs bcyond the immediate framework 
of this chapter, but 1 do trent it in an invcstigation of the concept of 
collective intentionality in connection to the theory of the embedded 
individual (Davis 2003). 
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(ii) Influences of iustitutions and social values 01l indivitiuals 
(agency's depende11ce upon social structure) 
Fírst, I suggcst that when social-economic institutions influence individual 
action and decision-making, they do so chiefly by altering the scope of 
action and individual dccision-rnaking. An institution, say a national 
labor law or an environrnental regulation, limits the spacc of activity in 
whích individuals can act, and thus lcads them to focus their decision-
making on an allowable space of activity. Individuals' subjectivity and 
self-concepts are consequently developed and transformed prirnarily in 
terrns of their extent of application, . rather than in tenns of changes in 
their rneaning or content. Sorne might wish to argue that institutions also 
influence the content of action and dccision-rnaking. Rather than argue 
this point, here I attcmpt to follow others more knowledgeable than I 
about the nature and history of thinkíng about institutions, who 
ernphasize that instítutions are best defined as networks of social relations 
and positions generally accepted by those to whom they apply (d. 
Rutherfor d 1994: 182n). Thus institutions appear to have theír primary 
impact on individuals by determining the space of allowable activity. This 
is also consistcnt \Vith thcir characterization as more highly settled~ n1ore 
formal social arrangements and associated sets of social positions. 
Second, then, social values may be' said to influence decision-making 
and individual subjectivity by altering their content and basis. That is, 
should individuals rely on sorne given set of reasons or rationales when 
acting in certain circumstances, being influcnccd by social values 
normally means that they adopt new reasons or rationales for ho'v they 
vv·ill act in those same or similar circumstances in the future. Moreover, 
since these new reasons or rationales constitute a new basis for individual 
action, they should also be thought to involve changes in individuals' self-
conceptions and self-concepts. Por example, adopting ncw religious 
vicws typically changes an individual's actions and interactions with 
others. At the same time, a change in religious views generally means a 
change in the individuaYs self-concept as it applies to the individual's 
perceivcd relation to the supernatural. At issue here is less the scope of 
existing views than the character of those views itself. Thus it seems fair 
to say that the impact that social values have on individuals is primarily 
in terms of the meaning and content of their actions. 
To be sure, because institutions and social values are similar in 
irnportant respects~ it is somewhat artificial to parcel out their effects as 1 
have done here. Thus, as will emerge in "\Vhat follnws, a good part of the 
justification for the distinction abovc lics in what it pcrmits us to say 
about complex processes of reproduction and transformation in an 
expanded agency-structure model. I no"Yv turn to an account of the model 
that combines the discussion of the last two sections. 
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(iii) The overall agency-stn1cture model 
Institutions and social values influence the scope and content of 
individuals' action and decision-making respectively, while individuals' 
interactive activity and shared values influence institutions and social 
values respectively. These processes clearly occur simultaneously. Though 
institutions create a framework within which individuals act, as for 
example exists "vith any set of laws, índividuals' interactions "vith one 
another may test that frarnework, perhaps causing laws to be rewritten. 
And though social val u es determine a basis for individual action, as when 
a conception of human rights guides individual decision-making, 
individuals may find that they share values regarding those rights at odds 
with that conception, perhaps leading to revision in a comrnunity's 
conception of human rights. At the same time, it seems reasonélble to say 
that these two pairs of reciprocally occurring proccsscs (institutions/ 
individual interaction and social values/sharcd personal values) also 
someho-w influence one another, and that we ought in principie to be able 
to describe how this occurs. It pays, however, to be ca u tious abo u t 
attempting to over-describe the agency-stmcture rnodel as if the social 
world were to be captured as a complete systern of interconnections, since 
the social world is arguably stratified, such that sorne levels of activity are 
emergent upon others, and thus strictly speaking not ínterconnected.3 
Thus to avoid portraying the world as a system of interconnections, and 
yet still p:rovide an account of the overall agency-structure model, in what 
follows I conccptualizc thc rclationship between these two pairs of 
reciproca! processcs in terms of possible tensions bet'V\•een them in an 
overall process that reproduces and transforms both agency and 
structure. Further, sincc chnngc originatcs on the agency side of the 
agency-structure modcl, I cxpla~n thcsc tensions as arising from the 
actions of individuals, first in tcrms of how they generate a change in 
social values, which are then in tension with society's institutions, and 
second jn terms of how thcy generate change in society's institutions1 
which are then in tension 'vith its social values. 
Consider first how change in a society's institutions may be brouglzt about 
by change in íts social values, for example in terrns of changes in the 
relationship between a society's legal framework and its conception of 
human rights. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century there 
was little tension behveen the basic legal framework of the United States_. 
the Constitution, and reigning social values that guaranteed human rights 
to the European-derived population while denying them to the African-
dcrivcd population. Yet by the middle of the nineteenth century social 
values regarding human rights 'vere in a process of change (especially in 
the North), and 'V'.'ere increasingly perceived to be at odds with existing 
legal institutions. 1vlore specifically, the social values/shared personal 
values reciproca! process underwent change élS the shared personal values of 
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religiously inspired slavery Abolitionists gained weight in the 
dctcrmination of Northcrn social values. This changc in social values 
helped gencrate change in US legal institutions by thc midd]e of the 
ninctccnth ccntury, including amendments to the Constitution itself. lt is 
true that this institutional change was also brought about by interaction 
behveen individuals outside of the frarnework of existing legal 
institutions, the war between the North and the South being an obvious 
cxamplc. But most historians agree that the new values in the North 
rcgarding the unacceptability of slavery played a key role in bringing 
about the war and subsequent institutional change, and thus a changc in 
social values may be seen as bringing about the change in institutions.4 
Both agency and social structure were reproduccd and transfonned in 
this process, but it is worth attending a bit more closely to change and 
transformation on the agency side of the model in light of the emphasis 
placed on understanding thc cmbcdded individual and subjectivity in 
this chapter. Thus, a change in shared personal values comes about when 
individuals inherit conceptual matcrials (the ínfluence of structure on 
agency) and then, in 'criticizing' these rnaterials and the practices they 
entail, come to entertain new self-conceptions. Northem Abolitionists? 
that is .. grasped the moralities of a society accepting of human rights for 
sorne but not for others, found the self-conceptions these moralities 
implied unacccptablc, and forrned new self-conceptions rcgarding their 
personal stances toward slavery. As these new self-conccptions and the 
personal values they involved began to be sharcd by many individuals, 
social values regarding human rights and slavery began to change. Here, 
the question naturally arises as to what brought about the abandonment 
of old self-conceptions and the adoption of new ones in this process? But 
in an irnportant sense this question is innppropriate. The agency-
structure model presupposes that a genuine dynamic exists with 
influence on change arising in both agency and structure. The expanded 
agency-structure model "\-vith a more developed account of individuals 
and subjcctivity expJains the dependence of structure on agency by thc 
trcatmcnt of individuals in social psychological terms as reflexive and 
active. In short, individuals simply have a genuine capacity to criticize 
theír conceptions and self-conceptions. 
Consider now how change ín a society's social values can be brought abmit 
by change in its institutions. The feudal system in medieval Europe 
involvcd n set of economic institutions, such as manorial production and 
inherited class relationships, anda set of associated social values, such as 
that individuals have a customary, inherited place and vocation in life and 
that ruling classes had paternalistic rcsponsibility for the well-being of the 
laboring classcs. Mnrket behavior~ as was to emerge with capitalism, 
involves an alternative set of econornic institutions, such as contracts and 
the wage system, and its own set of social values, such as the rights of 
private property and thc idea of the individual as a locus of freedoms. 
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When in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries individuals began to 
place greater reliance on market relationships with one another, they also 
began to put in place new econornic institutions not consistent with the 
social values of feudalism. In this case, changes in individual interaction 
brought about change in econornic institutions, which in tum generated 
tensions between institutions and social values. Of course it might 
alternatively be argued that change in shared personal values was also a 
source of change in the social values of the time. I don't argue that this 
\Vas not the case. But it seems many historians would agree that a change 
in economic practices played a partícularly important role in Europe's 
abandonment of feudalist socin1 values, and thus a chunge in institutions 
may be sccn as bringíng about a changc in social values. 
Again, in light of thc cmphasis placed in this chapter on the theory of 
the embcddcd individual and the agcncy sidc of thc agcncy-structurc 
model, it is worth attending a bit more closely to how changes in 
individual interaction might rcflect individuals' changing sclf-
conceptions. Thus, whcn individuals rcstricted themsclves to customary, 
feudal economic relationships, thcir sclf-conccptions \vcrc traditional, 
inhcrited oncs. But whcn thcy began to engage in market transactions, 
thcy had to scc thcmsclvcs in nc,v, unfamiliar capacities. Taking 
individual interaction outside of established institutions to be primarily a 
matter of changes in thc scope of activity, this changc in individual sclf-
conceptions and self-concepts was a matter of not just a change in the 
scope of individual activity, but also a change in scope of individuals' sclf-
conceptions, which were enlarged to include the capadty to produce for 
exchange. The emergence of market institutions solidificd this change. 
Again, Ido not attempt to explain why individuals were able to seek out 
new forms of economic interaction after centuries of traditional economic 
relationships. The agency-structure model makes agency dependent 
upon structure, but also structure dependent upon agency, and the 
appearance of new forms of individual interactions in markets counts as 
evidence of the latter. The emphasis here lies rather on developing a 
clearer conception of changes in agency, or individuals' subjectivity. Thus 
whereas changes in shared personal values alter the basis on which 
individuals form self-conceptions, changes in individual interaction 
enlarge the scope of those self-conceptions. 
Of course, my two examples - the nineteenth-century rise in 
opposition to African-American slavery in the United States and the 
emergence of market behavior in medieval Europe - are only highly 
schematic characterizations of complex historical processes that have 
been treated at much greater length by historians. My purpose in setting 
them forth is to illustrate two things: first, that the agency-structure 
model can advantageously be broken down into hvo types of reciproca! 
processes (institutions/individual interaction and social values/shared 
personal values), and, second, that enlarging the rnodel to incorporate a 
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more developed understanding of embedded individuals and subjectivity 
adds to the explanatory pm..ver of thc modcl. Since this chapter seeks to 
use the agency-structure modcl to hclp dcvelop a conception of the 
embedded individual for heterodox economics, Ido not attempt here to 
furthcr claboratc or defend this interpretation of the model, but rather 
now turn to a classification of heterodox economics schools both 
according to their apparent reliance or emphasis on institu tions and 1 or 
social values as means by which individuals and society influence one 
another, and according to their associated conceptions of the embedded 
individual 
V Six heterodox schools: concluding remarks 
The six schools of heterodox economics I address, roughly according to 
thcir ordcr of emergence in contesting post-war orthodox econornics, are: 
institutionalist economics, social economics, radical/Marxist econornics, 
Post Keynesian econornics, ferninist econornics, and ecological econornics. 
None are explicitly understood by their proponcnts in terms of the 
agency-structure model, but all arguably rely on the principal tenet of the 
model, narnely;. that agency and structure, however identified, are 
depcndcnt upon one another. Thus all generally avoid the (tvvin but 
oppositc) errors that face social science and social theory, voluntarism and 
rcification/ determinism, and accordingly all are neither methodological 
individualist nor methodoiogical collectivist in orientation. First, then .. 
how rnay these schools be dassified according to their emphasis on 
institutions and/or social valucs as thc mcans by which agency and 
structure influence one another? 
Institutionalist economics and social economics are relatively easy to 
characterize in that traditionally the former has ernphasized institutions 
and the latter social values as the chief means by which agency and 
structure ínfluence one another. Institutionalism does not ignore social 
values, but largely treats them as reflecting institutional relationships. 
Social economics does not ignore society's institutional structures, but 
generally explains thern as rcflcctivc of social value attachments. In 
contrast, radical/Marxist and Post Keynesian cconomics seem to involve 
conflicting views regarding the roles of ínstitutions and social values. 
Radical/Marxist economics emphasizes the institutionalized nature of 
class relationships underlying labor exploitation and capital 
accumulation, but ulso emphasizes the role of class consciousness in 
revolutionary and liberation struggles, which involvcs social values. Post 
Keynesian economics emphasizes the institutionalized nature of liquidity 
and uncertainty in a capitalist market economy, but on the social value 
side also emphasizes investor animal spirits and the question of public 
con1mitrnent to dernand management. Finally, feminist and ecological 
economics seem to have evolved in the "\-Veight they assign to institutions 
----------------------------------- -----
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and social values, though in different dircctions, \Vith feminist economics 
no\v placing greater weight on social values and ecological economics 
now placing greater \Veight on institutions. Feminist economics originally 
gavc greater weight to laws and institutionalized systems of 
discrimination in the econorny in explaining gender inequality, but has 
increasingly emphasized gendered social altitudes, as are for exarnple 
manifested in household relationships and child-rearing, as irnportant. 
Ecological economics originally emphasized public conscíousness 
regarding the environrnent, but has given increasing \Veight to changing 
legal frame\vorks limiting corporate activities. 
What, then, may we conclude frorn this regarding different conceptions 
of the embedded individual in thcsc hctcrodox schools? In 
institutionalism, individual cmbcddcdncss is undcrstood chiefly in terms 
of the institutions/individual interaction reciproca! processes relating 
agency and social structure. That is, individual activity is influenced by 
institutions (agency depends on structure), and individual activity 
changes institutions (structure depends on agency}. In social economics, 
individual embeddedness is understood chiefly in tcrms of thc social 
values/shared personal valucs rcciprocal proccsscs rclating agcncy and 
social structure. That is, social values and shared person values influence 
and depend upon one another. In radical/Marxist and Post Keynesian 
economics, individual embeddedness can be explained on both bases. On 
the one hand, this produces richness in explanation across these two 
schools when each is taken as a whole. On the other hand, since the two 
schools tend to be divided between those giving greater emphasis to 
either the institutions/individual interaction or the social values/shared 
personal values processes, general conclusions within the hvo schools 
about individual embeddedness are difficult to achieve. In feminist 
economics, individual embeddedness is increasingly explained in terrns 
of the social values/shared personal valucs processcs, though with thc 
institutions/individual interaction processes as a framework within 
\vhich this occurs. Similarly, in ecological econornics, the 
institutions/individual interaction processes are explained within the 
social valucs/shared personal values processes. These two latter schools 
perhaps offer the most explanatorily powcrful accounts of individual 
embeddedness in their implicit integration of both sets of processes in 
overall agency-structure analyses. 
What these differing emphases suggest is that a general account of the 
individual as socially and econornically ernbedded for heterodox 
economics could be based on a critical realist agency-structure model 
enlargcd with social psychology thínking about thc sclf-conccpt. Different 
heterodox schools give different kinds of emphasis to institutions and 
social values, but the agency-structure rnodel can make use of both types 
of means in terms of hvo reciprocally occurring processes1 
ínstitutions/individua1 interaction and sodnl values/shnrcd personal 
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values, which each have effects upon one another. This overall 
frame,vork, 1 suggest, is reflective of heterodox economícs as a rcsearch 
prograrnme altemative to mainstream econornics. From this perspcctive, 
the different schools 'vithin heterodox econornics might be classified 
according to their irnplicit implcmentation of this framework. At the same 
time, in so doing a general account of the individual as socially embedded 
begins to emerge for heterodox economics. 
The explicit reflection about thc agcncy-structure relationship 
prompted by an encounter wHh critical realism might also help heterodox 
economists to avoid a tcndency "vhich sorne of them display towards the 
provision of one-sided accounts of thc means by which agency and 
structure influence one another. The risk that heterodox schools such as 
institutionalism and social economics run is that by concentrating so 
hcavily on institutions and values respectively, they prc-judge the 
irnportance of those factors and thereby run the risk of offcring a distorted 
analysis of the processes through which agency and structure interact 
with one another. Critica! realism providcs a timely reminder that the 
guestion of whether the interplay bctwccn structure and agency centers 
primarily on institutions or on social values cannot be answered a priori 
but only ex posleriori through concrete research. Critica! realism, then, 
leaves conceptual room for a variety of processes through which agency 
and structure interact and as a result is more able to do justicc to the 
complexity of the structure-agency relationship than schools which pre-
judge its nature. And by alerting heterodox economists of these schools to 
potentially explanatorily significant avenues of influence that might 
otherwise be ignored, critica! rcalism heJps to further the development of 
explanatorily powerful economic analysis. 
Notes 
1 These different strategies also arise in conncction with other standard (and 
related) tapies of investigation in the social psychological literature such as 
'role playing' and 'social comparisons,' which similarly concern how others' 
opinions influence individuals' self-appraisal. 
2 See Lewis (2000) for a discussion of causal strategies in connection with the 
debate between Bhaskar and Harré. 
3 Archer (1995) advanced this criticism of Giddens' structuration thcory. 
Emergence may be defincd as 'a relationship between two features or aspects 
such that one arises out of the othcr and yct, whilc perhaps being capab1e of 
rcacting back on it, remains causa1ly and taxonomically irreducible to it' 
(Lawson 1997: 63). 
4 Another example along these lines is the struggle over the political rights of 
\Vomen. A social value transformation regarding whether women werc 
entitled to basic political rights was caused by the increasing influcncc of 
shared personal values of those in thc Suffragctte movement in the early 
twentieth century. This led to institutional legal changc beginning with 
voting rights to womcn, and continuing with more recent Jegislation such as 
the 1962 Equal Pay Act. 
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